Our study is one of the first natural experiments around the role of leaders in the context of firms. Also while most prior natural experiments around leadership in the policy world have exploited the death of the leader, we exploit an alternate exogenous shock -rigid bureaucratic rules that constraint the appointment of leaders to 42 Indian public R&D labs with 12,500 employees. The bureaucratic rules ensure that the timing of leadership change is uncorrelated with observable or unobservable firm level characteristics. This enables us to circumvent the issues related to the use of manager fixed effects in the prior empirical literature. Efforts to incentivize individual employees to file and license patents did not meet with immediate success.
However patenting and licensing both increased once leaders at individual labs were replaced.
Introduction
"The greatest leader is not necessarily the one who does the greatest things. He is the one that gets the people to do the greatest things" -Ronald Reagan
To what extent do individual leaders influence the behavior of their followers and thereby shape firm behavior? In economics, there is an expanding empirical literature examining natural experiments around leadership though most studies have focused on the role of leaders in the policy or academic world (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Jones and Olken, 2005; Azoulay et al., 2010) . When it comes to the role of leaders in the context of firms or research entities, there are no comparable natural experiments. This paper attempts to fill this gap by exploiting a natural experiment around leadership change within India's state owned laboratories. Also, while most prior natural experiments on leadership in the policy world are focused on the untimely death of the leader, we exploit an alternate exogenous shock -rigid bureaucratic rules that constraint the appointment of leaders to India's state owned laboratories.
In fact, empirical work in economics on leadership within firms is quite thin with the notable exception of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who employ manager fixed effects to study this question and conclude that individual leaders (top managers like the CEO and CFO) matter for a wide range of corporate decisions. The use of manager fixed effects is a powerful empirical tool to isolate the effect of individual leaders from firm level characteristics. But this does not preclude the possibility that the timing of individual leaders leaving and joining the firm is correlated with firm level characteristics. If indeed the timing of leaders joining and/or leaving firms is correlated with observable or unobservable firm level characteristics, then even manager fixed effects may not be a complete way to test for the effect of leaders on firm behavior. The novel contribution of this paper is to exploit a natural experiment in the context of Indian public R&D labs where the timing of leadership change is driven by rigid bureaucratic rules and is uncorrelated to firm level characteristics. This forms the basis of identification.
As Hermalin (1998) points out, the topic of leadership is relatively understudied in economics. The economic analysis of firms has focused on formal or contractual relationships.
To quote Hermalin, leaders "have been modeled as agents of other players who are not commonly seen as leaders (e.g., shareholders)." In this context, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) make an important contribution to the empirical literature on whether leaders matter in the context of firms. But there are several interesting theoretical questions that have not yet been studied by empirical researchers. As an example, Komai, Stegeman and Hermalin (2007) question why firms should even have a leader who has exclusive access to information? A related question is whether or not leaders matter to firm behavior in cases where individual employees have incentives to achieve the desired outcome. We make a contribution to this literature by empirically studying the effect of leadership change on top of studying the effect of incentivizing individual employees.
Beyond the empirical literature on whether leaders matter to firm behavior, there is also an emerging literature in economics and finance on what leadership characteristics matter. Lazear (2012) studies this question using data on Stanford alumni and finds that leaders are more likely to be generalists rather than specialists, both innately and in their pattern of skill acquisition. Kaplan et al. (2012) study individual characteristics of CEO candidates for companies involved in buyout and venture capital transactions and find that subsequent performance of firms is related to execution, resoluteness and over-confidence related skills of CEOs rather than interpersonal skills. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) report that firm leaders (CEOs, CFOs) who hold an MBA degree follow more aggressive strategies. More generally, there is also growing empirical work in economics on whether leadership is a "skill" and whether the skill is rewarded in the labor market. In a recent paper, Kuhn and Weinberger (2004) find that high-school leaders are more likely to occupy managerial occupations as adults, and leadership skills command a higher wage premium within managerial occupations than in other jobs. We make a contribution to this literature by collecting and analyzing CVs of leaders of Indian public R&D labs and by comparing traits of newly appointed leaders to traits of their predecessors.
Our empirical setting is comprised of 42 state-owned labs in India, all reporting to a single parent organization, The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) that primarily has a vision-setting role for the individual labs. The Indian labs are similar to other public R&D institutions across emerging markets, examples being Embrapa and Fiocruz in Brazil, the CSIR labs in South Africa, etc. Collectively the CSIR labs in India employ 12,500 scientific and technical staff. This is in comparison to 6,800 employees at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the United States, one of the labs studied by Jaffe and Lerner (2001) , a key paper in the prior literature on public R&D. 2 We collected data for the 42 labs under the CSIR fold over 1995 to 2006, providing cross-sectional and time series variation. For each lab, we collected annual data on lab leadership change, government budgetary support, licensing revenue from multinationals, patenting, publications and control variables related to the location and the nature of science pursued by each individual lab. We also collected CVs of individuals who had served as leaders of these labs at various points in time. The 42 labs started from a base of negligible foreign patents and ended up with more patents than all domestic private firms combined. The labs were then able to license several of these patents to multinational firms, and revenue from multinationals increased from 3% to 15% as a fraction of government budgetary support. This performance improvement did not adversely affect citation-weighted publications, so it did not manifestly come at the expense of the public science role of the labs.
We document that this transformation was triggered by two events-(1) a one-time incentive policy change that affected individual scientists across all labs and (2) changes in the leadership of individual labs that takes place over a period of time. The leaders of these labs will be henceforth referred to as lab directors. Rigid government employment rules led to lab director changes whose timing was uncorrelated with lab level characteristics; this provides the basis for identification. Lab directors could be replaced only when the incumbent director retired or completed the contract period which was of a fixed duration of six years. Incumbent directors could not be replaced because of nonperformance or because of disagreement with the new goal of Intellectual Property (IP) commercialization. In robustness checks, we manually checked to confirm that leadership change followed the stated bureaucratic rules. Our findings indicate that incentivizing individual scientists to file and license patents did not immediately lead to lead to the desired outcome of IP commercialization. Foreign patents filed and licensing revenues both increased only after the lab directors were replaced. The lab directors appear to create a context within which the incentives matter.
Our findings also inform the literature on public R&D. The innovation and public R&D literature, that includes Henderson et al. (1998) , Jaffe and Lerner (2001) , Lach and Schankerman (2008) , etc., documents higher levels of IP creation by public R&D entities in the U.S. in This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the related literature on leadership change, state owned entities and public R&D; Section 3 outlines the empirical setting; Section 4 presents our empirical specifications and data; Section 5 presents the results; and Section 6 interprets the results. All tables and figures are presented at the end.
Theory
We build on the theory literature on leadership in economics starting with Hermalin (1998) .
In this paper, the author focuses on the question of how the leader leads, i.e. how a leader with private information about the return to effort can convince her followers that she is not misleading them. Hermalin (1998) makes a distinction between leadership and authority and points out that choosing to follow the leader is a voluntary decision of her followers. Followers have to believe that the leader has better information and hence will choose to follow her. The model outlines two possible ways in which the leader can convince her followers that she is not overstating the private information that she has access to. She could either sacrifice, i.e. make a side payment to her followers or she could lead by example. In leading by example, the leader commits effort to signal information. In turn, followers work hard based on more optimistic beliefs about the leader's information. Komai, Stegeman and Hermalin (2007) take a step back and ask a logically prior question on why there should even be a leader who has exclusive access to information. In this model, the authors prevent the full revelation of the state and this in turn induces followers to work harder, at least in some states, than they would were the leader's action to reveal the state fully. This creates a potential motive for centralizing information in the hands of a single leader. Hermalin (2007) extends his prior work and builds in a repeated game where leaders gain credibility and acquire as well as retain followers by demonstrated success.
3 Henderson et al. (1998) studied the effect of the Bayh-Dole Act that allowed universities and nonprofit institutions to retain titles to patents derived from federally funded R&D. This reform also allowed government-owned labs to grant exclusive licenses on government-owned patents.
There is also a related theory literature focused on visionary leadership and in this literature there are three relatively recent models developed by Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) , Van den Steen (2005) and Vidal and Moller (2007) . These models exemplify a biased leader with strong beliefs influencing her followers. Work by Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) has shown how a 'visionary' leader affects the incentives of employees and the implementation of innovative projects within firms. In this model, a visionary leader is biased toward certain kinds of projects and against others. The followers then know that the organization is likely to favor investments that are consistent with this vision and, thus, they work hard on such projects, particularly if they can be rewarded for their efforts only when their projects are implemented. The authors model a firm with two employees, or product divisions, working on two different projects. They model 'vision' as the bias of the leader towards one particular project. Such vision improves the incentives of one of the employees and reduces the incentives of the other. Van den Steen (2005) builds on this and additionally considers a sorting effect. The beliefs of the leader influence the choice of projects undertaken by the followers. He shows that a stronger belief of the leader increases the effort and utility of employees who agree with her. Such employees get easier approval for their projects they undertake, and end up with a higher expected return on their efforts. His model also shows that this decreases the effort and utility of employees who disagree with the leader. These differential effects on utility then give rise to sorting: a firm attracts employees with beliefs that are similar to those of its leader. 4 Finally, Vidal and Moller (2007) show that self-confidence helps a leader overcome his motivational bias towards making decisions that subordinates want to see; thus making information sharing with subordinates attractive.
There is a growing empirical literature focused on natural experiments around leadership, with most studies focused on the role of leaders in the policy or academic world. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) exploit randomly assigned reservations for women to village councils in India and show that the reservation of a council seat affects the types of public goods provided. Jones and Olken (2005) use deaths of leaders while in office as a source of exogenous variation in leadership, and ask whether these randomly-timed leadership transitions are associated with shifts in country growth rates. They find evidence that leaders matter, particularly in autocratic settings. Besley et al. (2011) also use the death of national leaders to establish that educated leaders help their countries achieve higher growth rates. Azoulay et al. (2010) exploit the death of academic "superstars" and show that the untimely death of a superstar leads to collaborators experiencing, on average a lasting 5% to 8% decline in their quality-adjusted publication rates.
However there are no comparable natural experiments around leadership in the context of firms or research entities. Johnson et al. (1985) the chief executive officer (CEO) departs, the probability of non-CEO top manager turnover increases markedly. They also demonstrate that the probability of the non-CEO manager leaving increases with an increase in 'co-worker complementarity' between this individual and the CEO.
Karpoff (2001) conducted a cross-sectional comparison of 35 government-funded and 57
privately funded Arctic expeditions and found that the government expeditions had higher failure rates, attributable to poor leadership structures and perverse incentives. The author measures 'quality of leadership structure' by whether or not the same individual initiated and implemented the plan of action. However the Karpoff study does not measure the effect of leadership change on performance, something that our study is focused on. In fact leadership is only one of the themes of the Karpoff paper that is focused on other themes such as teams adapting to new information and incentives.
We extend this empirical literature on leadership by exploiting the presence of a natural experiment in the context of the Indian public R&D labs. The natural experiment, which will be explained in detail in the following section, helps us alleviate the concern that the timing of leaders joining and/or leaving the firm might be correlated with observable or unobservable firm level characteristics. We also study the effect of leadership change over and beyond the effect of incentivizing individual employees. Finally we compare traits of successful leaders to their predecessors.
Given that we are studying leadership in state owned R&D labs, we are also motivated by insights from the state owned entity (SOE) reform literature. Both the theory and empirical literature on state-owned entities (SOEs)-notably Shleifer (1998) and Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) -overwhelmingly support privatization. 5 However, this may not be a feasible policy option for a large number of SOEs, including public R&D labs. 6 There are a few empirical 5 Several inefficiencies of state-owned firms (e.g., principal agent issues, lack of residual claimant, absence of motivation and monitoring, soft budget constraints) have been documented in the agency theory and property rights literature. An excellent survey of the SOE privatization and reform literature is provided by Megginson and Netter (2001 However, none of the prior studies in this literature has analyzed the impact of leadership change on IP commercialization.
Empirical Setting
India's 42 state-owned national laboratories are organized under an autonomous umbrella organization, The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), and collectively they have around 12,500 scientific and technical employees. The laboratories, covering all major scientific and engineering disciplines, were created in the 1940s and 1950s. Until the 1980s, the main goal of the labs was to indigenize imported technologies in areas such as tractors, food processing, pharmaceuticals, and polymers. In his prior assignment as director of one of the CSIR labs (National Chemical Laboratory or NCL, based in Pune), Dr. Mashelkar had great success in securing U.S. patents on polymers and sector. Jones et al. (1999) document that in a sample of share-issue privatizations from 59 countries, just 11.5% of the firms sold all of their capital and less than 30% sold more than half of their capital. 7 Li (1997) documents improvements in factor productivity of Chinese SOEs following improved incentives and compensation. Lau et al. (2000) document the "contract responsibility system" introduced in Chinese urban SOEs. Brandt and Zhu (2000) analyze Chinese SOEs from 1986 to 1993 both to document the role of "soft budget constraints" for Chinese SOEs and the eventual decentralization of credit. Aivazian et al. (2005) 
3.3.Appointment of New Leaders at Individual Labs
The change of director at individual labs is the main empirical event we studied. Lab directors were the 'leaders' at these Indian public R&D labs and their responsibilities included selecting what projects and technologies to focus on, negotiating strategic alliances with external entities and allocating resources to various projects. In fact, the role of the lab director was critical in implementing the new goal of IP commercialization. It is plausible that incentivizing individual scientists to develop IP is insufficient since commercialization needed incremental resources that could only be allocated by a lab director sympathetic to the 'patent, publish, prosper' mantra.
Importantly for our identification strategy, leadership change at individual labs was an event whose timing was exogenous, given rigid government employment rules. Lab directors were appointed by the parent organization. New directors could be appointed only at the end of the six-year contract period of the incumbent director or if the incumbent director had reached the retirement age of 60 years, whichever came first. The parent organization had no control over when lab directors could be replaced; but had control over who was to be appointed as the new director when the change happened. If a new director had a positive influence on IP commercialization, we should observe a spike in patenting and licensing revenue in years after the lab director change. Patent filing should increase immediately after the lab director change.
However, we expect to observe a lag in the growth of licensing revenue given the lead time needed to search for buyers of IP and the time needed to finalize licensing contracts.
Dr. Mashelkar was able to implement leadership changes at 36 of the 42 laboratories. We took into account every single leadership change event at each of the labs between 1995 and 2005. We explored why six of the labs did not experience a director change and found various reasons: four labs were merged into other labs as a result of organizational restructuring and one lab ceased to exist. 
3.4.Two Generations of Leaders
Interviews with CSIR scientists revealed that several new directors played an important role in implementing the new goal of IP commercialization. Though the new directors had no flexibility in increasing the government budgetary support for a lab, they could direct resources toward projects that had a higher likelihood of being commercialized. As an example, new directors like 13 In robustness checks, we excluded such labs from the regression analysis; the results remained consistent. The new leaders were part of a new generation of leaders who believed in the value of IP commercialization and over a period of 10 years, they replaced the old guard. An example of this new generation of leaders was Ehrlich Desa, the director at the National Institute of Oceanography (NIO) who publicly stated that, "My task now is to lead NIO in the current environment, where we have to do first-rate oceanography while earning revenue." 14 This is in stark contrast to the old guard, who were trapped in a dependencia mentality rooted in government budgetary support and were often suspect of the role of multinational firms.
Our qualitative analysis indicated that several incumbent lab directors, with longer tenures at the organization, resented this move toward IP commercialization. Senior scientists from the preMashelkar era expressed fear that CSIR in general and NCL in particular, might become "a lab on rent" for multinationals. 15 Mashelkar was criticized within the CSIR for being on a World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) panel and for pushing for product patents. His critics within CSIR said that this would lead to an "astronomical increase in the prices of agro seeds and pharmaceutical medicines". 16 Arguably, the attitudes of the old guard towards the multinationals and the WIPO reflected the angst prevailing in past decades about multinationals acting rapaciously in poor countries.
Empirical Specifications and Data

Effect of Leadership Change on Revenue and Patenting
We analyzed the impact of leadership change on foreign patenting and licensing revenue. As discussed earlier, based on director appointment rules at Indian national labs, we conceptualized director change at labs as a leadership change event whose timing was exogenous. Also, in To test the effect of director change on foreign patent filings, we ran the following specification:
( 1) log ( had an immediate effect, the year dummies immediately after 1995 should be significant. The lab dummies help control for the underlying technological area of a lab and differences in U.S.
patenting rates for different technological areas. In both specifications, robust standard errors were clustered at the level of the lab.
To test the effect of director change on revenue from multinationals, we ran the following specification, additionally controlling for foreign patent filings by the lab: We also collected CVs of 61 directors across 36 labs. Our field-work based data collection is in the tradition of insider econometrics, a term used by Ichniowski and Shaw (2006) to indicate empirical work that uses organizational level datasets assembled using extensive fieldwork.
We would like to bring to focus a limitation of the data. In the case of Specifications 1 and 2, we were not able to include years prior to 1995 in the analysis. Prior to 1995, foreign patenting at CSIR was driven by one single lab, NCL. This lab (where Dr. Mashelkar was prior to his taking over the role at CSIR) had 88% of CSIR foreign patents in 1994, though this share came down to 18% over time. 21 For all labs except NCL, patenting would be zero before and after director changes prior to 1995 and, hence, we could not include years prior to 1995. Table 3 reports the impact of lab director change on the level of foreign patent filings. 23 Foreign patents filed by a lab increased in the years following a director change; this relationship is positive and significant for Year 1 post-director change and Year 4 post-director change. All else being equal, patent filing was 39% higher in Year 1 post-director change and 42% higher in Year 20 For certain variables, we were able to collect data for 1993 to 2006. A bureaucratic process decides on the level of government budgetary support for individual labs based on past year expenses and size of the lab; this process did not change from 1993 to 2006. We also had to match laboratory names across multiple data files and track laboratory name changes, laboratory mergers, lab closures, etc. 21 The trend of NCL's share of CSIR foreign patents is available from the authors. 22 The 15% figure is the average from 2003 to 2006. Summary data also reveals that while the number of U.S. patents granted and the revenue from multinationals increased by 13 and 29 times, respectively, from 1995 to 2006, the level of Indian patents granted and government budgetary allocation increased by only three times and 1.5 times, respectively. 23 In addition, we also conducted univariate t-tests for patents, government budgetary support, and revenue from multinationals for pre-and post-director change lab-years, reported in Table 2 .
Results
Summary Trends
Effect of Leadership Change
4 compared to the baseline director change year. 24 This indicates that there is an immediate increase in patent filings post-director change, but the maximum increase comes in Year 4 postdirector change. There is no statistically significant effect for the coefficients of the dummies indicating years prior to the director change. Columns III and IV of Table 3 repeat the analysis, but instead of considering individual year dummies prior to and after the director change event,
we considered two-year windows pre-and post-director change.
25
In subsequent interviews with lab directors, we explored possible reasons for why we get a statistically significant positive effect for foreign patent filings in the year following leadership change and then again in Year 4. Our interviews indicate that the appointment of new leaders "immediately unlocked the stock of existing possible patents sitting on the bench". There is then a conceivable time lag in identifying and working on new technologies and filing new patents and this is indicated by the statistical significance of the year dummy in Year 4.
In Table 4 , the dependent variable is ln_revenue_MNC, i.e., log of revenue from multinationals. 26 Column I presents the baseline results, while Columns II and III additionally control for government budgetary support and foreign patent filing. The results indicate that there is a positive and statistically significant relation between revenue from multinationals and the dummy variables for Years 4 and 5 post-director change. In Columns II and III, we also find that there is a positive and significant coefficient for the dummy variable for Year 3 post-director change. As theorized, we observed a lag in lab director change and the increase in revenue from multinationals, while foreign patent filing increased immediately after the director change.
All else being equal, revenue from multinationals is 84% higher in Year 4 post-director change compared to the baseline director change year and is 57% higher five years later.
27
Among the control variables, we found a negative effect between government budgetary support and revenue from multinationals post-director change. Labs that had larger government budgetary support may have been less inclined to generate revenue from multinationals compared to the labs that had less budgetary support. We also controlled for foreign patent filings and found a positive relationship between foreign patent filings and revenue from multinationals, though this relationship is not statistically significant.
Collectively, these results indicate that individual lab directors played an important role in the increase in foreign patents and licensing revenue at these labs.
Interesting insights are also obtained by analyzing the coefficients of the year dummies in Tables 3 and 4 (reported in Figure 3) . 28 We find that the year dummies are statistically significant only starting in 2000 for the foreign patents filed regression and starting 2003 for the revenue from multinationals regression. This needs to be understood in context of the incentive policy plan being implemented in 1994 across all labs. Collectively, these results seem to indicate that the one-time simultaneous incentive policy reform that affects individual scientists at all the labs did not lead to an immediate uptake in patenting or licensing. It was only when the individual lab directors were replaced that the labs saw an increase in the creation and commercialization of IP. It appears that the lab directors appear to create a context within which the incentives matter though it is conceivable that the year dummy result is driven by other forces such as increasing human capital, anticipation of TRIPS in India, etc.
5.3.Observable Leadership Characteristics
We conducted additional analysis focused on the leadership change event. We collected CVs of 61 directors across 36 labs and compared the pre-Mashelkar era directors ('old') and the Mashelkar appointed directors ('new') across the following parameters-age, total number of Indian and foreign patents prior to joining the lab as director, number of countries visited, number of awards, and number of research papers in domestic and international journals.
Directors were classified as "old" if they joined their position prior to 1994 and "new" if they joined the lab as director starting in 1995. 29 For each director, we computed these measures at the beginning of their tenure. Table 5 reports the results. On average, new directors are younger, are better travelled, and have more research papers.
We further explored whether the director change effect was related to greater "affinity" between Dr. Mashelkar and the newly appointed directors. This is to test whether or not Dr. 28 The year dummy for the revenue regression in year 2006 exhibits a very large, statistically significant coefficient. Interviews corroborated that this was due to capitalization and recognition of two large licensing deals in that year. We excluded 2006 from the regression and the results remain robust 29 We dropped 1994 from the analysis as we were not sure whether or not Mashelkar had a say in director changes made in that year
Mashelkar appointed his close confidantes as the new lab directors. Using the data available in the CVs, we were able to construct a measure of affinity between Dr. Mashelkar and each director both before and after the director change event. We used the data in the CVs to identify whether the individual directors had ethnic, educational, or professional ties to Dr. Mashelkar, and we constructed the measure of affinity as an average of these three types of ties. 30 Assuming that the affinity between Dr. Mashelkar and each old lab director prior to 1994 was exogenously determined, we then explored how affinity changed after the director change. There were 17 lab director changes for which we were able to collect both pre-and post-director affinity. In four cases, affinity scores went down after the director change; in two cases, affinity scores increased;
and in the other 11 cases, the affinity measure remained the same. All prior regression results
were also robust to change in affinity, indicating that the positive effect of leadership change was not related to increased affinity between Dr. Mashelkar and the new lab directors. In summary, the new lab directors were not close confidantes of Dr. Mashelkar.
5.4.Robustness checks
We subjected our results to a battery of robustness tests. To check whether the bureaucratic rules predict director changes, we conducted interviews to confirm that the first director change at each laboratory post 1995 followed either of the two administrative rules, completion of six-year contract period or incumbent retirement. 31 We also regressed the timing of the leadership change event on the level of government budgetary support, level of patents, number of publications, etc., of individual labs, and found no correlation. We also checked for collinearity between the director change dummy and year dummies with government budgetary support as well as percentage change in government budgetary support, and found no correlation.
32
To ensure that our results were not being confounded by any policy change at CSIR other than that reported, we collated an exhaustive set of internal circulars and memoranda that outlines policy changes at CSIR laboratories from 1994 to 2004. As part of government rules, CSIR laboratories are mandated to publish each and every policy change as an official "circular."
30 The overall measure of affinity was coded between 0 and 1. Analyses are available from the authors. 31 We conducted multiple interviews with individual labs, the CSIR headquarters and did secondary searches to corroborate this analysis and to the best of our knowledge, we did not find any exceptions to the two rules 32 This analysis is available with the authors We collected and analyzed 159 circulars from the years 1994 to 2004 and, in summary, found no such confounding effect.
We also investigated whether leadership change could be used as a repeated tool to help technology commercialization at these labs. For that purpose, we divided the total number of director changes in the period 1995 to 2005 into "first-time director changes" (i.e., the first director change in the Mashelkar era starting in 1995) and "second-time director changes" (i.e., subsequent director changes in the Mashelkar era).We then regressed foreign patent filings and revenue from multinationals against interaction dummies for each first lab director change and each second lab director change. Based on several interviews we confirmed that each of the first director change events post 1995 followed one of the two bureaucratic rules. However we could not exhaustively confirm the same for all second director changes and for the sake of robustness, conducted 'intention to treat' analysis for second director changes.
Results are reported in Tables 6 and 7 and indicate that the lab director change effect was being driven by the first lab director change at these labs and not the second lab director change.
The first director change has a statistically significant effect on both foreign patenting and revenue from multinationals. The second director change event, however, has no statistically significant effect on foreign patenting or revenue from multinationals in the post-director change years. This indicates that leadership change in this context is effective only when it is implemented for the first time under the new regime and may not be effective when the new steady state has been achieved. It is conceivable that the first set of lab directors appointed by Dr.
Mashelkar were unlocking the stock of existing IP to potential buyers.
We also explored external policy changes that might affect our results and noted a major Indian patent law reform in 1999. Prior empirical studies that examined the impact of domestic patent reform include Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) and Lerner (2002) ; all of these studies report that patenting by domestic residents either declines or remains stagnant post-patent reform. The Indian patent reform should have made it more attractive for all entities, including CSIR labs, to patent in India; however, our analysis shows that CSIR labs moved their patent mix toward U.S. patents post-1999. We also conducted robustness checks that show multinational revenue at labs increasing in response to increasing U.S. patents, but not in response to higher domestic patents.
To test for the passage of time effect, we compared the U.S. patent grants of the CSIR labs to U.S. patents granted to other Indian public R&D labs and to Indian private firms and find that CSIR labs out-perform all other Indian entities in the time period 1994-2004. 33 We repeated Tables 3 and 4 using two additional specifications-a quasi-maximum likelihood conditional fixed effects Poisson model with standard errors clustered at the lab level and OLS with log(foreign patents filed+1) and log(revenue_MNC+1) and standard errors clustered at the lab level. The results remained consistent. We also used additional control variables and controlled for the number of Indian patents granted and filed by labs, and the results remained consistent. In addition, we accounted for additional control variables like type of science being pursued and lab location, and the results remained consistent. 34 Our results are also robust to choice of dependent variable. We used patents granted instead of patents filed.
Finally, CSIR's move toward greater commercialization raises a question of whether or not the labs consequently compromise on their public science and R&D role, that of creating and disseminating scientific knowledge for the public good. We collected data on publications and the quality of publications at CSIR labs. Analysis shows that CSIR labs did not compromise on their public science role during the study period. 35 Results are reported in Table 8 and indicate that citation-weighted publications increased consistently starting in 2000. Even from 1996 to 1999, citation-weighted publications increased compared to the baseline year of 1995, though the result is not statistically significant. However, we are aware of limitations of this analysis. First, it is possible that publications could have increased even more if there was no focus on commercializing revenue. Second, it is conceivable that the new directors were unlocking the commercial potential of older technologies locked up in older publications. We do not have a way to test whether the licensed patents related to old or new publications. We also checked for the effect of director change on patent quality and found that patent quality measured using forward citations per patent increased after the director change event.
33 For this analysis, we compared U.S patent grants to CSIR laboratories to U.S. patent grants to other Indian public R&D labs and Indian domestic private firms. For each patent, we code the variable "ownership." The variable can take the following values: CSIR, Indian private, or Other Public R&D. In this analysis, we use firm ownership information from the CMIE Prowess database. We code 1,344 U.S. patents (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) with data from the USPTO 34 To account for these time invariant variables, we ran random effects models. 35 In the public R&D literature, Azoulay et al. (2005) classify publications as a measure of "fundamental pursuit of knowledge" as opposed to patents that embody "applied research."
Conclusion
Our study makes a contribution to the empirical literature in economics on whether leaders influence the behavior of their followers within firms, thereby shaping firm behavior. We contribute to a growing literature in economics focused on natural experiments around leadership, though prior studies are focused on the role of leaders in the policy or academic world. To the best of our knowledge, there are no prior natural experiments around leadership in the context of firms or research entities. Additionally, while most prior natural experiments on leadership are focused on the untimely death of the leader, we exploit an alternate exogenous shock -rigid bureaucratic rules that constraint the appointment of leaders to India's state owned laboratories.
The presence of a natural experiment enables us to circumvent the issues related to the use of manager fixed effects in the prior empirical literature. Our main empirical event is the appointment of leaders (lab directors) to Indian public R&D labs where the timing of appointing leaders is mandated by rigid bureaucratic rules and is uncorrelated with firm level characteristics.
The parent organization of the labs could not change a lab director based on nonperformance, but had to wait for the incumbent to retire or complete the contract period. Under these rules, we found that patent filings were 39% higher in Year 1 post-director change compared to the baseline lab director change year. This is similar to the 50% increase in patenting at the U.S.
federal labs result reported by Jaffe and Lerner (2001) . 36 We also found that four years postdirector change, licensing revenues from multinationals increased by 84%.
We also study the effect of leadership change in addition to studying the effect of incentivizing individual employees. In 1994, the parent organization of the Indian public R&D labs first introduced incentives for individual scientists across all the labs to file and license patents. Then over time the parent organization appointed new leaders for individual labs. We demonstrate that incentive policy reform at the Indian public R&D labs did not immediately lead to the desired outcome of IP commercialization. However, foreign patents filed and licensing 36 Jaffe and Lerner (2001) studied the impact of the initiatives since 1980 to encourage patenting and technology transfer at the U.S. national laboratories. Their analysis is based on 23 federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) from 1977 to 1997. Specifically, they studied the effect of the 1986 reform that encouraged patenting and technology transfer by labs, and they report that patenting post-1986 was 50% greater than patenting prior to 1986. In 1986, the Federal Technology Transfer Act allowed government-operated facilities to enter into cooperative R&D arrangements with industry. It also allowed labs to grant outside collaborators the title to any invention that resulted. However, they do not study the effect of leadership. Our results also contribute to the literature on royalties in licensing agreements. Saracho (2002) outlines conditions under which royalty licensing is more attractive than fixed-fee licensing revenues both increased after the appointment of individual lab directors. It is however conceivable that the delayed year dummy result is driven by other forces such as the anticipation of TRIPS in India. However the case study of Mashelkar's laboratory (NCL) outlined earlier
shows that with a patent-oriented leader, patenting and licensing happened even prior to the introduction of formal incentives. This emphasizes that what really matters is the role of the leader. In addition, we also contribute to the emerging literature on traits of successful leaders and find qualitative evidence that suggests that the new leaders at the Indian labs were younger, better travelled, and had more research papers.
Our empirical results and the qualitative evidence we collected in interviews is consistent with several insights of the prior literature on leadership in economics. Consistent with Bertrand and Schoar (2003), we show that lab leaders matter; we also show specific ways in which the effective leaders differ from the old guard. Consistent with the "leading by example" model of Hermalin (1998) , it is conceivable that the new leaders at the CSIR labs were using the 'Mashelkar model at the National Chemical Lab (NCL)' as a template for IP commercialization at their own labs. This is also corroborated in our interviews with scientists who shared that the new leaders were using Mashelkar's success at NCL to convince their own followers about the benefits of committing effort to patenting and licensing. Similar to Mashelkar, who had a productive research career and had traveled extensively to the U.S. to secure the GE polymer patents, the new leaders were more productive in research and were better traveled than their predecessors. Collectively, these insights are consistent with the sorting argument of Van den Steen (2005) , the co-worker complementarity idea of Hayes, Oyer and Schaefer (2005) and the leader self-confidence argument of Vidal and Moller (2007) .
In conclusion, our findings are directly relevant to public R&D entities across emerging Notes: This table reports results of lab fixed effects regressions of logged foreign patent filings on the postdirector change dummy interacted with indicator variables for the year relative to the year of director change. The sample is all CSIR labs. For Columns I and II, the explanatory variables are post-director change dummy interacted with the indicator variables for years relative to year of director change. For Columns III and IV, we consider two-year windows prior to and after the director change. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the lab level. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Notes: This table reports results of lab fixed effects regressions of logged revenue from multinationals on postdirector change dummy interacted with indicator variables for the year relative to the year of director change. The sample is all CSIR labs. For Columns I-III, the explanatory variables are post-director change dummy interacted with the indicator variables for years relative to year of director change. For Column IV-VI, we consider two-year windows prior to and after the director change. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the lab level. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Notes: Sample is all CSIR labs. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Azoulay, Ding, and Stuart (2006) classify "publications" as a measure of "fundamental pursuit of knowledge" as opposed to patents that embody "applied research." The dependent variable (log of citation-weighted publications) is measured using number of publications and impact factor measures using Thomson indices. The results indicate that citation-weighted publications increase consistently starting in 2000. We use fixed effects, but results are robust to choice of specification. Robust standard errors are clustered at the lab level. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
